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Those who cannot remember the past are condemned 
to repeat it. 
— George Santayana
Spanish Influenza of 1918–1919 killed more than 50 
million people worldwide over the course of two years.1 
The true origin of the 1918 influenza pandemic is 
unknown. During World War I, propaganda in war-
engaged countries only permitted encouraging news, so 
as a neutral party, Spain was the first country to publicly 
report on the health crisis.1 Thus, Spanish Influenza 
became a popular term. However, historical research 
has shown that Spain was an unlikely candidate as the 
initial source and some suggest that it originated in 
Kansas in the spring of 1918. 
Influenza pandemics have occurred regularly every 
30 to 40 years since the 16th century. Today, influenza 
experts consider the possibility of another influenza 
pandemic, not in terms of if but when. Due to the 
high likelihood of an influenza pandemic, planning is 
underway in many U.S. states and other countries. We 
reviewed the responses of two neighboring Minnesota 
cities during the 1918–1919 pandemic to gain insight 
that might inform planning efforts today. 
Many of the components of current pandemic 
influenza plans were utilized to some degree in Min-
neapolis and St. Paul during 1918–1919. Coordination 
between different levels and branches of government, 
improved communications regarding the spread of 
influenza, hospital surge capacity, mass dispensing of 
vaccines, guidelines for infection control, containment 
measures including case isolation and closures of pub-
lic places, and disease surveillance were all employed 
with varying degrees of success. We focus on medical 
resources, community disease containment measures, 
public response to community containment, infection 
control and vaccination, and communications. 
PandemIC BeGInnInGs In mInnesota
Minnesota’s first Spanish Influenza cases were identi-
fied in the last week of September 1918. As in the rest 
of the country, Minnesota’s first cases “were directly 
traceable to soldiers, sailors, or [their] friends.”2 Every 
military base and military hospital in the Minneapolis-
St. Paul area was severely affected. Case isolation was 
slowly implemented at both Fort Snelling and the 
Dunwoody Naval Detachment (military installations 
in Minneapolis). On September 30, the first day of 
isolation, cases numbered in the hundreds.3 
Influenza cases were not limited to enlisted men 
for long. In Minneapolis, the number of civilian cases 
outstripped the number of military cases for the first 
time on October 9, less than two weeks after the first 
case was identified in the state (700 civilian cases; 675 
cases at Fort Snelling).4 Influenza had become a report-
able condition in Minnesota on October 8 in response 
to the growing epidemic.5 
medICaL resourCes
Two major issues contributed to the gravity of the pan-
demic: the war effort and limited scientific knowledge. 
World War I was not only costly, it required much of the 
medical community to be stationed overseas. In 1918, 
little was known about influenza. While this lack of 
knowledge did not negatively impact infection control 
actions, effective treatment and prevention methods 
were not fully utilized.
When influenza first appeared in Minnesota on 
September 27, the state was ill equipped for a health 
crisis.2 Although World War I was coming to an end, 
more than four million Americans were mobilized and 
the nation’s resources were directed to supporting the 
war effort. An editorial in the Minneapolis Tribune daily 
newspaper described the lack of physicians and nurses: 
“The medical fraternity is severely taxed already. So 
many physicians and surgeons have gone to Europe or 
to training that those at home have more than they can 
attend to comfortably and to good advantage.”6
The number of influenza patients that needed the 
attention of physicians and nurses overwhelmed St. 
Paul and Minneapolis clinicians. The war’s consider-
able drain on the medical profession was compounded 
by other factors that hindered nurse and physician 
mobilization. Methods to keep them healthy while 
caring for influenza patients were ineffective. Many 
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health-care providers fell ill, and some died. At one 
point, Minneapolis’s City Hospital reported that “nearly 
half of the nursing staff has been ill with influenza in 
the last three weeks.”7 This bleak situation discouraged 
some clinicians from providing their services. Dr. H.M. 
Bracken, Secretary of the Minnesota State Board of 
Health, reported to Dr. Rupert Blue, U.S. Surgeon 
General, on his campaign to recruit physicians for the 
influenza effort: “A number who we have called for 
have made excuses and have not come at all.”8 Other 
physicians who were recruited by Dr. Bracken simply 
did not show up.9 
Dr. Bracken attempted to secure senior medical 
students for influenza work. Dr. Bracken worked not 
only with the U.S. Surgeon General but also with the 
Surgeon General of the Army, the Committee on 
Education and Special Training, and the Dean of the 
University of Minnesota Medical School for three weeks 
and still was unable to obtain senior medical students 
for assistance, because each party insisted that someone 
else had to authorize it. In the end, Bracken failed to 
receive any medical students.10 
Not surprisingly, Minneapolis and St. Paul hospitals 
proved to be inadequate to handle the large num-
ber of patients. Minneapolis’s City Hospital and St. 
Paul’s St. John’s Hospital were solely devoted to treat-
ing influenza patients. Non-influenza patients were 
transferred to other area hospitals. This inadequacy 
was not entirely due to the lack of beds and supplies; 
there simply were not enough healthy nurses. At City 
Hospital, Superintendent Dr. Harry Britton reported 
that the “hospital was caring for about 150 cases, and 
had about 70 on the waiting list. It had beds available 
for that waiting number, but not nurses.”11
In St. Paul, a system was set up between St. John’s 
Hospital and other hospitals to insure an adequate 
number of nurses to care for influenza patients, but 
unfortunately this system failed. Dr. F.C. Plondke, St. 
John’s Hospital’s Medical Director, complained that 
the other hospitals were abandoning their promises 
to assign help from their nursing staff. “The other 
hospitals had refused to furnish a single nurse to aid 
the fifteen who are caring for ninety patients at St. 
John’s from their individual nursing staffs.”12
In 1918, medical science maintained that influenza 
was bacterial in origin. Physicians at Fort Snelling 
claimed that the “bacillus influenza of Pfeiffer,” which 
is today known as Haemophilus influenzae, was the cause 
of Spanish Influenza.1,13 Nevertheless, despite this lack 
of understanding about viruses, advice to curb infection 
was relatively accurate. The Minnesota State Board of 
Health recommended the use of handkerchiefs to cover 
sneezes and coughs, plenty of fresh air, avoidance of the 
sick and of crowds, and to contact a physician if ill.14
CommunItY dIsease ContaInment
As influenza was beginning to take hold in the civil-
ian population, there was disagreement between the 
Minneapolis and St. Paul health commissioners, Dr. 
Guilford and Dr. Simon, respectively. Their approaches 
varied; Dr. Guilford tended to be broadly proactive 
to prevent cases, whereas Dr. Simon tended toward 
initiating activities in response to individual cases. Dr. 
Guilford believed that closing public places was the 
best course of action and that isolation of individual 
cases was useless.15 Dr. Simon asserted that isolation of 
influenza cases would be more effective in preventing 
the spread of disease.14 
The St. Paul Health Department and the Minnesota 
State Board of Health met Dr. Guilford’s strong advo-
cacy with opposition. Dr. Bracken, siding with St. Paul, 
questioned, “If you begin to close, where are you going 
to stop? When are you going to reopen, and what do 
you accomplish by opening”?11
Debate between the two cities on the merits of clos-
ing schools caused further strain. Dr. Simon held that 
St. Paul’s school nurses were the best defense against 
the spread of the disease, and that closing schools 
would allow cases to go undetected as the children 
would not be under any medical supervision. Dr. 
Guilford disagreed, pointing out that 30 school nurses 
would not be able to adequately care for the 50,000 
pupils in the Minneapolis public school system during 
a pandemic.16 Minneapolis closed the schools on two 
separate occasions (October 12 to November 17, and 
December 10 to December 29, 1918).
 Despite Dr. Simon’s conviction that the closing of 
public places would be ineffective, on November 6 St. 
Paul government officials overruled him and enacted 
a closing order for the whole city, including schools, 
theaters, churches, and dance halls. The St. Paul Citi-
zens’ Committee—consisting of 15 physicians, church 
leaders, and community members who were appointed 
by Dr. Simon—which was concerned by the record of 
218 new cases on November 5, as well as 36 deaths 
between November 4 and November 5, 1918, recom-
mended this policy change (Figure 1).17 The number 
of new cases began to decline 10 days later, with only 
24 new cases, and the next day, Dr. Simon reopened 
St. Paul businesses and churches. 
Minneapolis and St. Paul both attempted to combat 
influenza by limiting crowding in places with restricted 
access to fresh air. Both cities enacted streetcar regula-
tions aimed to keep the air in the streetcars fresh by 
mandating open windows and limiting the number 
of passengers to 84 (streetcars had a seating capacity 
of 46).5,17,18 Because the measure limiting the number 
of car passengers, implemented on October 26 in St. 
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Paul, was deemed successful, Minneapolis enacted a 
similar regulation on October 30.17 As an experiment, 
Dr. Bracken also proposed that St. Paul regulate the 
business hours of stores and theaters to keep streetcar 
congestion to a minimum. Once again, Minneapolis 
followed St. Paul’s example on October 16, 1918, by 
regulating the hours of retail stores, office buildings, 
and wholesale stores.19
There were several complaints that the mandate in 
Minneapolis to keep three streetcar windows open at 
all times caused people to get sick due to winter colds. 
A compromise was reached by Dr. Guilford allowing 
streetcars with heating and ventilation systems to close 
their windows once the temperature dropped to 32 
degrees Fahrenheit.20
St. Paul also targeted elevators as places where 
influenza could easily be transmitted due to the tight 
quarters and limited fresh air. Buildings with fewer 
than six stories were no longer permitted to use their 
elevators.21
Public response to community disease containment
The measures used to contain influenza greatly affected 
the day-to-day lives of citizens. While some accepted 
the changes imposed on them, others protested regula-
tions that they considered unfair. Some called for more 
stringent methods, while others blatantly broke the new 
rules that were intended to protect them.
The closing of public places in Minneapolis was 
announced in advance, so people rushed to complete 
those activities that would soon be banned, resulting 
in the very same crowded conditions the ban sought 
to prevent. “Downtown theaters were packed last night 
with patrons who took advantage of their last chance 
to see a performance until the ban is lifted.”22 While 
some St. Paul citizens were relieved that Dr. Simon 
initially pledged to keep public places open, others 
felt this was wrong. “Fear of influenza contagion in 
crowded places has reduced the patronage of St. Paul 
motion picture theaters by nearly half, according to 
reports to Dr. H.M. Bracken.”23
Many sporting organizations responded negatively 
to closing orders. For example, in November 1918, the 
bowlers of St. Paul drew up a petition that requested 
permission to begin bowling again.24 Minneapolis 
football teams chose to ignore the ban and attempted 
to play against each other in front of large crowds. 
Police were called in to disperse the crowds and halt 
Figure 1. Influenza cases in St. Paul as recorded by the St. Paul Health Department  
in the St. Paul Daily News, 1918–1919a
aCases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.
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the games.25 Minneapolis teams found a way to play 
despite the closing order. Because Minneapolis high 
school football games were banned, practice games 
were scheduled with St. Paul teams.26 Several estab-
lishments serving alcohol and food deliberately broke 
the closing order to continue their regular business. 
“One saloon was discovered with the back door route 
open.”27
The elevator regulations in St. Paul were particularly 
unpopular. “Some of the downtown hotels objected to 
stopping their elevators, saying that they would lose 
guests. This caused a change in the ruling to permit 
hotel elevators and those in apartment houses to oper-
ate.”28 Many insisted it was unhealthy for the sick to 
be forced to climb stairs in their impaired state, while 
others felt concerned that people would be shut off 
from fresh air if they were not allowed to use their 
elevators. Consequently, the city compromised and 
all elevators were back in use starting November 9, 
1918, although only one person per 5 square feet was 
permitted.29 
The Hennepin County School Board (where Min-
neapolis is located) was exceptionally defiant to the 
closing order. The school board was concerned for the 
health of the students as well as the “12,000 dollars a 
day” that the closing orders cost because teachers con-
tinued to be paid, and extra school days would have 
to be added to the school year.30 Against the explicit 
orders of Dr. Guilford, and the pleading of several 
Parent-Teacher Association officers, the school board 
reopened schools on October 21, only to be shut down 
on the same day under threat of police action.31 
In St. Paul, all influenza cases were supposed to 
be reported to a physician, who in turn was required 
to isolate the case in his or her own home and notify 
the health department. Several problems sprung up 
with these requirements that hampered surveillance, 
the care of patients, and protecting people from get-
ting sick. For one, both physicians and patients were 
often hesitant to bring attention to cases. “Physicians 
are not reporting their cases to prevent homes from 
being quarantined.”21 (Note: At the time of the 1918 
influenza pandemic, the separation of the ill from the 
general population, what is now referred to as isola-
tion, was termed “quarantine.”) The ill also sought to 
evade isolation in their homes by not seeking medical 
attention, or only seeking medical attention when they 
became gravely ill. “Hundreds of persons in the city do 
not call for medical assistance until the second, third, 
or fourth day and in many cases pneumonia already 
has developed when medical attention is first given.”29 
Staffing shortages made isolation even less desirable. 
Because there were a limited number of inspectors to 
release houses from isolation, houses were not released 
promptly from isolation.32 
Starting on November 15, St. Paul telephone opera-
tors went on strike. According to the Pioneer Press daily 
newspaper, “Less than one third the new cases [are] 
being reported to the health department,” as a result 
of the telephone strike.33 This strike not only affected 
the reporting of cases, but also isolation, as well as their 
release from such a measure. 
After all of the difficulties involved in establishing 
isolation for each case, some flagrantly disobeyed 
the isolation orders altogether. “Disregard of the city 
quarantine yesterday caused the arrest of one man who 
insisted on taking his child from the city hospital before 
the patient was ready to be discharged. The mother 
and father and the child later were found mingling 
with other persons in the neighborhood.”29
InfeCtIon ControL and VaCCInatIon
In addition to closing public places and isolating 
cases in their homes, both Minneapolis and St. Paul 
health departments took other steps to keep people 
from getting infected. The use of gauze masks, more 
stringent sanitation laws, and vaccination campaigns 
were deployed in this effort.
Directions for wearing the masks were issued to the 
public. “The outside of a face mask is marked with a 
black thread woven into it. Always wear this side away 
from the face. Wear the mask to cover the nose and 
the mouth, tying two tapes around the head above the 
ears. Tie the other tapes rather tightly around the neck. 
Never wear the mask of another person. When the mask 
is removed . . . it should be carefully folded with the 
inside folded in, immediately boiled and disinfected. 
When the mask is removed by one seeking to protect 
himself from the influenza it should be folded with 
the inside folded out and boiled ten minutes. Persons 
considerably exposed to the disease should boil their 
masks at least once a day.”21 However, there was incon-
sistent advice on the use of gauze masks. Dr. Bracken, 
of the State Board of Health, advocated the wearing 
of masks, though he did not wear one himself, saying, 
“I personally prefer to take my chances.”34 
Medical students working in clinics in each district 
of St. Paul distributed gauze masks.12 But the Citizens’ 
Committee rejected an ordinance requiring the wear-
ing of masks at all times, even though, “All physicians 
were united in the opinion that the gauze covering 
should be worn in hospitals or in the presence of 
doubtful cases.”35 Despite the lack of official orders 
requiring the wearing of masks and Dr. Bracken’s 
unclear message, many people sought out masks for 
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themselves. The Northern Division of the American 
Red Cross manufactured tens of thousands of masks. 
Minneapolis ordered 15,000 masks from the Red Cross 
on October 1, 1918.36 These masks were used by nurses 
in schools and hospitals, doctors, hospital visitors, and 
those suspected of being infected with influenza.37 
As the number of cases increased in St. Paul, 
employers sought ways to keep their workers healthy 
and productive. Several companies requested masks 
to distribute to their workers. Despite the thousands 
of masks provided by the Red Cross, still more were 
needed to fulfill the demand. The Citizens’ Committee 
suggested that companies ask their female employees 
to fabricate masks for all their employees.21 St. Paul 
introduced new sanitation laws that called for the 
sterilization of dishes and cups in restaurants and bars, 
and the banning of roller towels and common drinking 
cups in public restrooms.38
At least two different vaccines were administered 
in Minneapolis-St. Paul, neither of them effective as 
neither actually contained influenza virus. One made 
by bacteriologists at the University of Minnesota was 
purported to prevent pneumonia.39 The Mayo Clinic in 
Rochester, Minnesota, made another vaccine that was 
intended to prevent both pneumonia and influenza.40 
This latter vaccination was composed of Streptococcus 
pneumoniae types I, II, and III, S. pneumoniae group 
IV, hemolytic streptococci, Staphylococcus aureus, and 
“influenza bacillus.”41
Military personnel as well as civilians were inoculated 
beginning as early as October 4, 1918.37 Both city health 
departments purchased vaccine and distributed it to 
physicians at no charge to encourage widespread use. 
In Minneapolis, people desiring the vaccine “thronged” 
the offices of doctors hoping to be vaccinated, and 
in St. Paul it was reported that “thousands of persons 
have been inoculated.”39,42 Some physicians took advan-
tage of their access to vaccine and the public’s fear of 
influenza. According to St. Paul’s Citizens’ Committee, 
it was discovered that “a few physicians were charg-
ing a fat fee for inoculations.”29 This was particularly 
disturbing as the vaccinations were supplied to the 
physicians for free. 
CommunICatIons
Postal workers, Boy Scouts, and teachers were enlisted 
to provide educational materials to the public and to 
teach health precautions. Mail carriers distributed 
educational materials on their routes. Boy Scouts 
distributed posters to stores, offices, and factories in 
downtown Minneapolis.22 Minneapolis teachers who 
were put out of work by the closing of schools were 
asked to volunteer for a health education campaign. 
The main goals of the campaign were to get rid of 
shared drinking cups, which were the precursor of the 
water fountain, as well as the roller towels, which were 
used to dry hands after washing.43 St. Paul teachers were 
sent “to ascertain the plight of families worst affected 
by the epidemic.”28 This was accomplished through a 
canvas of homes where the teachers learned if anyone 
was sick, needed to see a physician, or needed food.27 
St. Paul set up a public kitchen, a children’s home, 
and an emergency hospital for these cases.21 
Limitations
Although the two cities chose different methods of 
disease containment, determining which method was 
more successful is challenging. Information on cases 
in both cities depended on ill individuals seeking the 
attention of physicians, who were in short supply. The 
physicians were then required to report the number 
of new cases each day to their city health department. 
The city then reported the total number of cases to 
the newspapers, which published the number of new 
cases and deaths each day. This chain of information 
left much room for error and possible falsification. 
Because St. Paul chose to utilize isolation and Min-
neapolis did not, case reporting varied greatly between 
the two cities. Individuals with influenza who had their 
status reported in St. Paul had to endure isolation 
until they were released with a physician’s approval. 
This may have discouraged people from seeking the 
attention of physicians, and thus being reported—an 
undesired consequence of enforced isolation (Table). 
Because those with influenza were not isolated in Min-
neapolis, more people might have felt comfortable 
seeking medical attention. This could explain why St. 
Paul had such a high case fatality rate compared with 
Minneapolis (Table, Figures 2 and 3).
ConCLusIon
Several factors impede direct comparisons of the two 
cities’ approaches. The cities border each other and 
Table. Minneapolis and St. Paul influenza cases and 
deaths, September 30, 1918, to January 6, 1919
	 Minneapolis	 St.	Paul
Total deaths 747 645
Total cases 14,411 4,399
Death rate (per 100,000) 264 300
Incidence rate (per 100,000) 4,781 2,049
Case fatality rate (percent) 5.2 14.7
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residents travel back and forth. Although the contain-
ment philosophies differed greatly, in reality St. Paul 
government officials overruled public health, and 
schools and public gathering places were closed in 
both cities for varying lengths of time. Although the 
effects of isolation vs. closure of public places cannot 
be specifically determined, other lessons can be learned 
from what happened in 1918. Many steps could have 
been taken to prevent illness and save lives. Prior plan-
ning, clear orders, as well as consistent and transparent 
advice and information to the public may have made 
a significant difference in the number of cases and 
deaths due to influenza in 1918.
There was a paucity of planning for a health emer-
gency when influenza first appeared. While the actions 
that the two city health departments took to stem the 
spread of influenza align closely with current pandemic 
plans, health officials had the disadvantage of trying 
to conceive and realize plans during a health crisis. 
Many current recommendations were implemented, 
including the use of masks, the use of vaccines (albeit 
ineffective ones), increasing the stringency of sanita-
tion measures, limiting crowding in public places, 
and trying to coordinate hospitals, nurses, physicians, 
and medical students to maximize resources. As part 
of maximizing human resources during an influenza 
pandemic, it is imperative that the safety of health-care 
workers is insured. The number of nurses and physi-
cians who fell ill and even died as a result of assisting 
in the fight against the pandemic scared other nurses 
and physicians away.
Had these ideas been generated prior to such a 
large emergency, several problems could have been 
averted. The debates and disagreements between dif-
ferent public officials and health agencies, as with the 
Hennepin County School Board and the Minneapolis 
Health Department or between the Minneapolis Health 
Department and the St. Paul Health Department, could 
have been discussed in advance. Supplies could have 
been stockpiled, business leaders and community mem-
bers could have provided input on controversial disease 
containment policies, and medical students could have 
been put to work in hospitals and communities that 
lacked physicians. Unfortunately, these disputes arose 
and continued throughout the pandemic. 
Clear authority and management by public health 
Figure 2. Influenza case rates per 100,000, Minneapolis and St. Paul, 1918–1919a
aCases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.
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officials were generally lacking at the federal and state 
levels. It was almost as if the fear of using their author-
ity led Surgeon General Blue and Dr. Bracken to fail 
to take decisive action. Surgeon General Blue suggested 
to Dr. Bracken, and all other state health officials, “the 
advisability [of] discontinuing all public meetings, 
closing all schools and places of public amusement… 
on appearance of local outbreaks.”44 Because this was 
merely a suggestion, and local outbreaks were not 
defined objectively, Blue’s urgent telegram had no 
effect.
On the state level, Dr. Bracken acknowledged that 
the St. Paul Health Department “followed his advice” to 
not close public places, and went on to say that St. Paul, 
“has the power to do the opposite any time it wants 
to.”11 This statement forced local health departments 
to define their own rules while attempting to decipher 
conflicting messages from the state and federal level.
Because clear orders were not being given to public 
health officials, the public in turn was not receiving 
transparent and consistent advice and information. 
Should the public wear masks? Why was it allowable 
to be next to someone in a streetcar and not in an 
elevator? Why were church services closed while Red 
Cross workers gathered in crowded conditions in those 
very same churches? Was influenza a life-threatening 
condition, or was panic the most dangerous element of 
the influenza pandemic? In Minneapolis and St. Paul. 
there was no single message on any of these issues. 
In many cases, the public had to decide for itself. In 
which case, the effect of the messages that were com-
municated only served to contradict each other. 
In reviewing this history, some lessons stand out. 
Recent analyses of nonpharmaceutical interventions 
during 1918 indicate cities in which multiple interven-
tions were implemented early in the pandemic fared 
better.45 Of primary importance is developing a plan 
ahead of time that incorporates all levels of govern-
ment health infrastructure and describes clear lines 
of responsibilities and roles. Plans for surge capacity 
and community containment must be discussed with 
stakeholders and consensus must be achieved.
Further, general approaches should be put forth 
for public comment and approval. The public health 
benefit of isolation should be weighed against the pos-
sibility that some people would be discouraged from 
Figure 3. Daily death rates per 100,000, Minneapolis and St. Paul, 1918–1919a
aCases were not uniformly reported on Sundays, so Monday’s data may be inflated.
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seeking care. Clear explanations of the reason for isola-
tion, generous employer support, and providing food, 
medicine, and social service to those in isolation may 
mitigate fears and increase cooperation. The public 
must also be educated about the reasoning behind 
other health measures (i.e., closures), should those 
methods be implemented.
Approaches and plans should be based on scien-
tific data whenever possible, and include input from 
ethicists. Unlike in 1918, a pandemic influenza vaccine 
will likely be available today, albeit four to six months 
after the pandemic starts. But similar to 1918, the 
challenge will be designing an orderly and ethical 
distribution of a scarce commodity. Further, experts in 
risk communication should assist in developing mes-
sages that are scientifically accurate, understandable, 
clear, and useful. Finally, we need to take careful note 
of local and national lessons from the past so we do 
not repeat them.
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